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The Committee on Foreign Investment in the United States (CFIUS) screens proposed 
takeovers of US companies by foreign companies to assess whether such acquisitions 
might threaten US national security.  
 
Principal CFIUS concerns are: 1) leakage of sensitive military or intelligence or dual-use 
technology to foreign companies or their home country governments; 2) provision of 
information technology (IT) access so that foreigners might conduct surveillance or 
sabotage via back-doors in IT systems; and 3) offering foreign companies or their home 
country governments quasi-monopoly control over goods and services that they may 
deny to US users. 
 
Foreign investment in the US—including foreign investment via acquisitions—is 
generally very beneficial to the US. Foreign companies bring good jobs, cutting edge 
technology and high quality-control procedures to the US economy. The US-based 
employees of foreign-owned MNEs earned an average income of US$79,979 in 2013.
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12% of all US productivity increases over the past two decades have come from 




The CFIUS process is chaired by the US Treasury, which is disposed to welcome inward 
FDI in all forms unless plausible threats to US national security can be clearly identified. 
CFIUS rejections of foreign acquisitions are quite rare—only four in the past twenty 
years—although companies sometimes withdraw their acquisition proposals when they 
are unable to mitigate CFIUS concerns. 
 
Congress and the White House are now proposing a fundamental “reform” of CFIUS 
regulations, via the Foreign Investment Risk Review Modernization Act (FIRRMA). 
These new “reform” recommendations would change CFIUS in three problematic areas. 
 
First, FIRRMA would replace CFIUS’s traditional narrow approach to identifying 
potential national security threats from specific acquisitions within industries to 
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identifying entire sectors of the US economy where foreign acquisitions from countries 
such as China and Russia should be prohibited. For example, CFIUS has previously 
rejected Chinese acquisitions of semiconductor companies that possessed technology 
crucial to improving anti-missile radar systems (gallium nitride technology). Under 
FIRRMA, the entire semiconductor industry could be placed out of bounds for Chinese or 
Russian acquisitions. 
 
Second, FIRRMA directs CFIUS to investigate “the potential effects of the covered 
transaction on United States international technological and industrial leadership in areas 
affecting United States national security, including whether the transaction is likely to 
reduce the technological and industrial advantage of the United States relative to any 
country of special concern” (italics added).3  
 
Excluding whole sectors, industries and areas of the US economy from foreign 
acquisitions, even if limited to foreign investment from a handful of specific countries 
(China, Russia, possibly others), so as to prevent erosion of US industrial and 
technological superiority, would unavoidably put the US government in the business of 
designing a national industrial policy.  This approach would require the US government 
to select some sectors to be protected, while designating other sectors to be open to 
foreign acquisitions.   Such a move opens the door to a political process for which there is 
no logical end in sight.  
 
Not only would the prevention of foreign acquisitions within whole industries exclude 
valuable technological and managerial inputs from external investors from entering broad 
segments of the US economy, but the change in the US approach would justify copycat 
sector-wide or area-wide exclusions on the part of other countries. Government 
authorities in Europe and Asia might well adopt mirror-image policies to avoid loss of 
industrial or technological leadership.  Once the rationale to prevent the erosion of 
industrial or technological leadership becomes accepted as legitimate, could the effort be 
limited to foreign acquisitions involving only a few countries? 
 
Third, FIRRMA proposes an extremely dangerous expansion of CFIUS authority to 
review commercial sales, joint venture arrangements and normal business licensing of 
intellectual property by US companies to foreigners.  FIRRMA permits CFIUS to screen 
commercial practices even if the sales and licenses involved are not covered for national 
security reasons by the US export control regime. 
 
It is important that Congressional revisions of CFIUS authority be refocused on specific 
national security threats that might plausibly arise from individual acquisitions rather 
than excluding entire industries and sectors of the US economy from foreign acquisitions, 
even if initially limited to China and Russia.  At the same time, the objective of 
protecting US industrial supremacy across the entire frontier of technologies in a zero-
sum manner should be rejected as the basis for US FDI policy. 
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Finally, CFIUS should be removed from interfering in normal sales and licensing of US 
intellectual property, and joint venture business relationships, when there is no national 
security rationale for prohibiting such. 
 
In the end, a reformed-CFIUS should mirror the old-CFIUS, perhaps embedded in a bit of 
non-substantive nationalistic rhetoric. 
 
The result would be an appropriately calibrated balance between keeping the US 
economy open to the benefits from foreign investment without jeopardizing US national 
security in the process.  
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